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CENTENNIAL ADDRESS: EMOTION, REASON, AND
THE PROGRESS OF LAW
Susan A. Bandes*
Many of you will recall a well-known story about former President
George W. Bush's first encounter with Russian President Vladimir
Putin. The former president famously said about Putin: "I looked the
-man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustwor-
thy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his
soul."
The notion of looking into Putin's eyes and seeing his soul met with
substantial scorn, maybe just because of a widespread consensus that
former President Bush had misread former President Putin's soul (an
article at the time was headlined: Bush Looks into Putin's Soul, Fails
to See Tyrant), but also because the entire soul-reading enterprise
sounds mystical, irrational, and inappropriate for questions of govern-
ance. And if so, perhaps it is surprising how much stock the legal
system places in the ability to resolve questions of deep character by
looking into the eyes of litigants and witnesses, reading their body lan-
guage, and evaluating other aspects of what the legal system calls "de-
meanor" and "credibility."
As the trial scholar Robert Burns has observed, we tend to hold in
our minds two contradictory conceptions of the trial process. One
views the legal search for truth as something factual and empirical;
there is an answer out there and we need to logically deduce it from
the evidence. Witnesses are either right or wrong. They are either
accurate or inaccurate, either telling the truth or lying. The other con-
ception views evidence as subject to interpretation and evaluation,
and recognizes that perspectives, emotions, values, and worldview will
influence fact-finding on issues of culpability and accountability. Any
trial lawyer worth her salt knows that proving up a case through dry,
deductive logic will rarely carry the day unless accompanied by a com-
pelling story with believable characters. Not only do trial lawyers
know this; so does anyone who watches courtroom dramas on TV-
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persuasion matters, and jurors are persuaded not just by the evidence
but also by the story it tells and whether that story is coherent and
compelling. We tend to hold both of these views of the trial simulta-
neously, but we tend to idealize the linear, factual model. The other
model tends to be viewed as somewhat disreputable-reserved for ju-
ries because they are laypeople and not trained lawyers, and for
showboating trial lawyers manipulating these jurors by playing on
their basest instincts.
No complex system will ever live up to its idealized version. But it
is cause for concern when the ideal blinds us to the real-to actual
problems we may be able to address through available means like jury
instructions, voir dire, or judicial training. And there is an even
deeper issue here-whether the concept of legal decision making as
logical, deductive, and affectless is ideal at all. Even if we could,
should we banish empathy, or emotion, or storytelling, from the court-
room? Sometimes the law seems to unabashedly favor this option.
For example, the advisory committee's notes to Rule 403 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the main rule for sorting out the probative
from the prejudicial, explain that "unfair prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly an
emotional one." The language is revealing: evidence is excluded if it
"stirs" or "inflames" the jury's emotions, or causes the jurors to aban-
don their mental processes and give expression to their emotions.
This legal formula reflects the folk knowledge view of emotions as
hot, chaotic, unpredictable flashes of feeling that interfere with our
ability to think coolly and rationally. Yet the law's deep-seated am-
bivalence on the role of emotion, empathy, and storytelling is well
illustrated by considering one of our system's most deeply venerated
values: the importance of demeanor evidence.
One of the primary functions of legal institutions is to create rules
and procedures to guide the deliberative process. For juries, for ex-
ample, we have rules of evidence that keep some sorts of information
from jurors entirely because they are too prejudicial, or not relevant.
We let jurors consider other evidence, but instruct them on how much
weight to give it-or even tell them occasionally to disregard evidence
they have already heard. In doing so, we make distinctions between
what is legal or extralegal, between the probative and the prejudicial.
These are legal distinctions, but they are premised, at least implicitly,
on assumptions about how people decide, and how their decision-
making process.can be guided and improved.
Some of these assumptions are easy to identify and amenable to
empirical testing-like the assumption that instructing a jury to disre-
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gard evidence will lead the jury to disregard evidence. Unsurprisingly
(to anyone who has ever made an effort not to think about some for-
bidden thing), studies have shown that such instructions usually back-
fire. People think even more about the forbidden topic. In such
situations, it seems reasonable that the legal system ought to take into
account the fact that it is engaging in a practice that elicits precisely
the opposite reaction from the one it is meant to elicit, and ought to
consider reforming its practice-perhaps by instructing jurors about
the difficulties of disregarding evidence, or perhaps by instructing
them much earlier in the process, before the inadmissible evidence has
had a chance to color their view of the rest of the trial.
Likewise, the legal system ought to take into account the fact that
much of what gets communicated in the courtroom is nonverbal, and
that this communication is also amenable to study and testing. Yet
demeanor evidence, the mainstay of the trial system, straddles the two
conceptions of the trial in a problematic way-one that has so far pre-
vented all sorts of interesting and important connections between evi-
dence law and the cognitive sciences.
Black's Law Dictionary defines demeanor this way. It includes the
tone of voice in which a witness's statement is made, the hesitation or
readiness with which his answers are given, the look of the witness, his
carriage, his expression of surprise, his gestures, his zeal, his bearing,
his expression, his yawns, the use of his eyes, his furtive or meaning
glances, or his shrugs, the pitch of his voice, his self-possession or em-
barrassment, his air of candor or seeming levity. Or, as one evidence
scholar summarized it "everything that is not captured by a cold evi-
dentiary record."
What is the purpose of demeanor evidence? Why do we prefer live
witnesses testifying in open court? What value does it add to a cold
evidentiary record? In some countries-Holland for example-most
evidence is introduced via documents. Our system, however, puts tre-
mendous faith in the power of observing a witness testify in open
court. It puts tremendous faith in the ability to evaluate demeanor.
Demeanor evidence itself is viewed as a crucial way to assess credibil-
ity, character, and other such attributes. This preference for live testi-
mony is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Permitting a victim to tes-
tify from behind a barrier so that her facial expressions cannot be seen
deprives the defendant of his right of confrontation. A defendant
who, because of psychotropic drugs, is unable to communicate facial
expressions, behavior, manner, and emotional responses, has been de-
prived of the right of confrontation. A visually impaired juror may be
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excluded because of an inability to read facial expressions. Likewise,
the ability of the fact-finder at the trial level to observe these non-
verbal cues and attributes is one of the primary reasons for appellate
court deference to the findings of the trial court. Whereas the appel-
late court is confined to the "cold record," the trial court can observe
facial expression, attitude, body language and other such cues at close
range. In these and multiple other ways, the law expresses its belief in
the power of demeanor evidence. So what is it that is being evaluated
here that makes live testimony so much preferable to reading testi-
mony on paper, or even to hearing it without seeing it?
The law tends to use mystical and unquantifiable language when
describing demeanor, calling it an elusive and incommunicable impon-
derable. This sort of language about the imponderable and the incom-
municable is the sort of language law often uses to describe internal
processes, emotional reactions, and other things it regards as unscien-
tific and unquantifiable. It tells us that a whole realm of human be-
havior is a black box-impervious to study. And that is dangerous.
The upshot of this attitude is not to banish these so-called "imponder-
ables" from the legal system. It is, instead, to allow them to operate
without scrutiny. And in fact, demeanor evidence is not impondera-
ble at all. There is increasing knowledge about how we read facial and
body language, how we understand the motivations and intentions of
others, and how those capacities might be improved. The legal system
can make these decisions in light of a growing body of psychological
and neuroscientific evidence on decision making, or else in ignorance
of it.
A while ago a handful of legal scholars published articles demon-
strating that most of us are not very good at reading demeanor to
figure out who is telling the truth. The problem is that this research
only skims the surface of courtroom dynamics. It seems to subscribe
to the factual, empirical model of the trial-witnesses are either right
or wrong, truth tellers or liars. It only examines the thinnest slice of
what is getting communicated through facial expression and body lan-
guage, appearance and tone of voice, and other such factors. And it
barely hints at the problems of sorting out the relevant from the irrel-
evant and the probative from the prejudicial in the information we
get-or think we get-from demeanor.
These questions are not merely academic. Consider the following re-
cent issues that will require resolution:
(1) Recently, a Muslim woman who was plaintiff in a civil suit in
Michigan had her case dismissed because she would not testify with-
out wearing her niqab (a scarf and veil covering the entire face ex-
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cept for the eyes). The judge reasoned that without seeing the
plaintiff's face he could not judge the veracity of her testimony.
(2) A proposed Illinois Supreme Court rule would make it accept-
able to require incarcerated criminal defendants to participate in
their trials via videoconferencing rather than in person. The Chi-
cago Council of Lawyers opposes the rule. They base their opposi-
tion, in part, on empirical evidence that videoconferencing
technology reduces the jury's or judge's empathy for the defendant,
and that this lack of empathy leads to more severe sentencing.
(3) Empirical research demonstrates that one of the most important
factors in whether a capital defendant is sentenced to death is
whether he shows appropriate remorse in the courtroom. Jurors ex-
pect to be able to evaluate from facial expression and body lan-
guage the level of remorse not only of defendants who testify, but
even of defendants who don't-and are simply present in the court-
room. Yet there is no good evidence that remorse can be judged
from facial expression or body language.
A common thread tying these evidentiary issues together is the
power of nonverbal communication and other factors that are not re-
flected in a written trial transcript. Another, unfortunately, is the le-
gal system's failure to consult the growing body of scientific and social
scientific knowledge about the operation of empathy, the ability to
read emotion through facial expression and body language, and other
work that breaks open the black box of demeanor evidence.
First of all, it is not just the demeanor of witnesses that gets evalu-
ated in a courtroom. It is the demeanor of the judge, the other jurors,
the "off-stage" actors like bailiffs and clerks, as well as the families
and others sitting in the spectator's seats. Secondly, it is not just truth
or falsity, or accuracy or inaccuracy, that are being evaluated. It is
character. And therein lies the complication. Our evaluation of char-
acter is a complex amalgam of factors, some of them clearly legally
relevant (candor and trustworthiness), some of the clearly irrelevant
(attractiveness, race, class, ethnicity), and some of them both difficult
to categorize and difficult to split off (likeability, familiarity). It might
be comforting to believe that we are capable of evaluating the rele-
vant things, while cordoning off "extralegal" or irrelevant factors like
class, race, ethnicity, attractiveness, familiarity, and likeability. But
we are not-at least not without assistance.
The overarching issue, from the standpoint of cognitive psychology
and neuroscience, is how we come to understand the internal states of
other people. As the philosopher and law professor Jeffrie Murphy
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once said with typical dry wit, the law often behaves as if it has a
window into the soul. He was skeptical, observing that issues of deep
character are matters about which the state is probably incompetent
to judge-it cannot even deliver the mail very efficiently, after all.
Tennessee Williams once lyrically observed how cloudy the glass is
through which we look at one another, distorted as it is by our own
egos.
Yet in law, as in life, we must constantly try to predict the internal
states, motivations, and intentions of others. How do we do this?
There are several fascinating strands of research in the cognitive sci-
ences and social sciences, which I can touch on but briefly.
One thing we know is that the quest for understanding begins with
the basic capacity for empathy. In brief, empathy is the recognition
that others have thoughts, desires, motives, and intentions different
from one's own, and the capacity to infer the internal states of others.
Empathy is not sympathy-it is not in itself the desire to help another.
Despite the impression given at the recent judicial confirmation hear-
ings of Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor, empathy is not
something we can choose to bring into the legal system, or not. Just as
we are always speaking in prose, we are always using empathy-
though we are not always using it very well. Empathy is an essential
capacity for interpersonal relations. The lack of empathy is one of the
central deficits of autism. The lack of empathy is also, when coupled
with lack of remorse, a central characteristic of the psychopath. The
well-functioning person cannot operate without empathy.
Humans, unlike other creatures, have complex internal lives, and to
survive and thrive we must be able to communicate them among our-
selves. As the neuropsychologist Jonathan Cole wrote that the human
face enables empathy. Humans first gained knowledge of the cogni-
tive states of others through the ability to read facial expressions and
body language.
This is a powerful explanation for the value added by demeanor
evidence and in-court testimony more generally. They do give us in-
formation. They do facilitate empathy. Thus something important
may well be lost if we require a defendant to testify via videoconfer-
ence instead of in person, or permit a litigant to testify with her face
covered. But these are in part empirical questions, and once we see
that empathy is at work here, we can begin investigating some impor-
tant issues. If we are reading the desires, intentions, and motivations
of others, how well are we doing it?
One very hot topic in the cognitive sciences right now is the study of
our ability to read emotions from facial expressions. In the first place,
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it is not at all clear that emotions can be correlated with specific physi-
ological measures. Even if there are some emotions that can be
"read" via facial expression, studies show that this varies tremen-
dously from one context to another. Researchers have found a weak
correlation between facial expression and predicted emotion outside
the lab. And thus far, there has been little if any research on how the
courtroom in general, or being on a jury or on trial in particular,
would affect the expression of emotion. Yet this idea that decision
makers can read emotion in the courtroom is entrenched, despite the
fact that getting it wrong can have serious consequences.
Secondly, and more promisingly, there is a rich vein of study on the
dynamics of empathy, which shows that empathy can be not only stud-
ied but educated. Empathy is a capacity that not everyone possesses
in equal measure. Some have more empathic accuracy than others.
Empathy is selective. It tends to flow most easily toward those like us,
or toward those in whose shoes we can imagine ourselves. People
tend to impute their own internal states to those they perceive as simi-
lar (part of their in-group), but resort to bias and stereotypes to infer
the internal states of those they view as dissimilar (or part of an out-
group). There is ample evidence that empathy is more effortful across
racial lines. Empathic accuracy is also challenged by other differ-
ences, including ethnicity, age, and class-what the scholar Craig Ha-
ney calls "empathic divides." Yet in the legal system, much turns on
empathic accuracy.
For example, whether a defendant shows appropriate remorse may
make the difference between life and death; yet, we have no particular
facility for gauging remorse. Several studies have found the defen-
dant's perceived remorse (based on in-court observations of the de-
fendant even in cases in which he never testifies) to be one of the
major factors influencing whether he is sentenced to death. Read ac-
counts of murder trials and you will more often than not run into a
reference to whether the jury or judge found the defendant appropri-
ately remorseful. In the trial of Scott Peterson, the prosecution por-
trayed his unflinching behavior as he sat silently at the witness table as
the cool calculation of a killer. In Scott Sundby's book detailing his
interviews with men and women who had served on a capital jury,
Sundby noted that the jury paid as much attention to the defendant's
demeanor as to the evidence. Jurors became increasingly angry at
what they perceived as the defendant's nonchalant, arrogant attitude
as he sat in the courtroom. It called to mind, first, a New Yorker car-
toon that was amusing only because it was so accurate, in which a
lawyer advises his client: "Make eye contact with the jury, but not
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
homicidal maniac eye contact." More seriously, it recalls something
Karla Faye Tucker, before she was executed in Texas, told the writer
Beverly Lowry about her capital murder trial: "Her lawyer had told
her to try to look dignified and calm and so she was trying to look
unmoved by the proceedings and when she did they said she was cold,
and when she smiled at her father the press reported that she had
smiled at someone else, so she never looked out in the courtroom
again." She was right to be concerned. Studies show that a defendant
who appears emotionally involved, sorry, or sincere during trial is less
likely to be sentenced to death than a defendant who appears bored
or uninvolved. One problem is there is no evidence supporting the
view that we can evaluate remorse from demeanor. And there is
some very disturbing evidence to the contrary. William Bowers and
his coauthors have documented the impact of an empathic divide be-
tween races on the ability to evaluate remorse and other attributes.
For example, they reported that after observing the same defendant
and interpreting the same mitigating evidence, black jurors saw a dis-
advantaged upbringing, remorse, and sincerity, while white jurors saw
incorrigibility, a lack of emotion, and deceptive behavior.
One final strand of research I will briefly mention involves feeling
and display rules. We evaluate the feelings of others in light of im-
plicit, often unconscious assumptions about what one ought to feel in
certain circumstances and how one ought to express those feelings.
Several studies, for example, have found that decision makers find
rape accusers more credible if they testify with a high degree of emo-
tionality. The failure to exhibit strong emotion violated an expecta-
tion about how a credible rape victim would express her feelings.
It might be comforting to believe that we are capable of evaluating
the relevant aspects of character, while cordoning off "extralegal" or
irrelevant factors. But even as to those factors whose irrelevance
seems pretty obvious, we need assistance. Take attractiveness, which
several scholars have quite reasonably argued is irrelevant to judging
demeanor. It is not only that people do take it into account, which
they do, it is also that it colors their evaluation of other attributes.
The "halo effect" leads people to assume the witness is not only more
attractive but also more credible. And the converse is also true-
obesity, for example, has been linked to less favorable verdicts. These
influences often don't operate on a conscious level, and this lack of
conscious influence poses a real challenge for the legal system. The
standard ham-handed approach of simply instructing jurors not to
take something into consideration is likely to be inadequate, espe-
cially if the jury does not think it is doing the forbidden thing in the
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first place. But how to overcome improper influences is a rich topic,
and one we can focus on quite productively once we acknowledge the
scope of those influences. There is a substantial and growing body of
psychological research showing that even our subconscious assump-
tions-our empathy deficits, stereotypes, and unconscious biases-can
be educated. And there is much more to learn about how to structure
our legal institutions to bridge empathic divides.
Jeffrie Murphy, who has written some powerful critiques of the le-
gal system's reliance on evaluating remorse, has suggested that we
ought to declare remorse irrelevant-to simply instruct judges and ju-
ries to disregard it. I think this would be impossible; there is a deep-
seated human need to evaluate remorse when faced with wrongdoing.
But juries and judges can be made aware of the limitations of facial
expression and other indicia of demeanor in evaluating remorse. This
is just one specific aspect of my larger point. We have the capacity for
comprehending the intention and motivations of others. These tools
are imperfect, but they are amenable to correction and guidance. We
have much more to learn, and we have many tools at our disposal,
including jury instructions, expert witnesses, judicial training, re-
forming the rules for jury selection and composition, to name a few.
The alternative, a legal system that operates free of the messy, chaotic
effort to understand and evaluate human intentions, motivations and
character, is not something we ought to aim for-even if we could.
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